. The Boundaries of Article III:
Delegation of Final Decisionmaking
Authority to Magistrates
In the last decade Congress has steadily expanded the adjudicatory role of magistrates in federal district courts. When the office
was created in 1968,1 magistrates were limited to hearing nondispositive motions and conducting pre-trial conferences and hearings; 2 final decisionmaking authority in all cases was reserved for
the federal judge. In 1976, Congress allowed magistrates to undertake without the parties' consent "such additional duties as are not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."'
Under this elastic provision, some magistrates exercised the authority to render final decisions when the parties consented.4 With
the passage of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 5 Congress expressly granted magistrates the power, upon designation by the
district court and consent of the parties, to conduct "any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter" as well as criminal
misdemeanor trials.6 Their judgments need not be reviewed before
I Congress established the office of United States magistrate in the Federal Magistrates
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 34013402; 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1982)).
2 Under the 1968 Act, a judge may designate a magistrate to preside over certain pretrial hearings, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982), to conduct evidentiary hearings and submit
recommendations for disposition, id. § 636(b)(1)(B), and to serve as a special master, id.
§ 636(b)(2).
' Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3)
(1982)). The 1976 amendments allowed the magistrate to be assigned pretrial matters, to
hear nondispositive motions, and to serve as a special master. See id. These amendments
were partly a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461
(1974), which interpreted the statute to bar a magistrate from rendering decisions on habeas
corpus petitions.
4 Courts adopted different local rules about consensual reference to magistrates. See,
e.g., Behnami v. Golden Bear Family Restaurant, No. 78 C 1156, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9,
1980) (discussing standards for judicial review of magistrate trial where local rules do not
specifically provide for magistrate trial); Oliver v. Allison, 488 F. Supp. 885, 886 (D.D.C.
1980) (noting an experimental local rule allowing magistrates to conduct civil trials); McCabe, The FederalMagistrateAct of 1979, 16 HAav. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 359-61 (1979) (observing that in 1978 "magistrates in over half of the district courts conducted 540 civil trials
upon the consent of the litigants").
' Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1982)).
6.28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982). The two conditions mentioned
are both necessary to allow magistrate adjudication: the district judge must refer the case to
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entry as final decisions of the district courts.7 Magistrates' decisions may be reported, and thus may carry precedential force in
future litigation.8 In sum, magistrates now exercise the key powers
of district court judges: they decide motions, take evidence, instruct juries, and render final decisions. 9
Although federal magistrates now exercise authority similar to
that of federal judges, they are not granted the tenure or salary
protections of article III of the Constitution. Magistrates are appointed for limited terms, 10 and can be removed by the district
court judges whom they serve. A statute protects their salaries
from diminution during their terms," but no constitutional barrier
prevents Congress from eliminating this protection. Furthermore,
unlike federal judges, magistrates are appointed not by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, but by the judges
of the district in which the magistrate will operate. 2
When Congress adopted the 1979 Act, most observers thought
that the enlarged power of magistrates did not violate article III.'3
Courts began to consider the question only after Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,14 in which the
Supreme Court struck down Congress's broad delegation of juris-

the magistrate and the parties must consent to the reference. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982);
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (allowing federal courts to refer cases to magistrates in accordance
with section 636(c)).
7 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1982).
1 See infra note 118.
9 Once a case is delegated to the magistrate, only two elements distinguish the magistrate from the federal judge. First, the magistrate does not have the power to punish for
civil or criminal contempt. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (1982). Second, the case before the magistrate
may be removed to the district court upon motion of the court or "under extraordinary
circumstances shown by any party." Id. § 636(c)(6).
10 Id. § 631(e). Full-time magistrates are appointed for eight-year terms; part-time
magistrates are appointed only for four-year terms. Id.
1 Id. § 634(b).
12 Compare id. § 631(a) (appointment of magistrates) with 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1982) (appointment of district court judges).
13 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1469, 1473 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 287, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]; McCabe, supra note 4, at 400.
This view was by no means universal. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra, at 31 (dissenting
views of Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman); Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 560,
583 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Article I Courts]; Note, Article III Constraintsand
the Expanding Civil Jurisdictionof Federal Magistrates:A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J.
1023 (1979); see also Note, The Validity of United States Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, 60 VA. L. REv. 697 (1974).
14 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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diction to bankruptcy courts. 5 Since then, ten federal courts of appeals have ruled that the delegation of final decisionmaking powers
to magistrates is consistent with article 111.16 Indeed, one circuit
recently found an attack on the constitutionality of the 1979 Act
"frivolous" and assessed attorneys' fees against the appellant. 7
Despite this "unbroken phalanx" of authority, 8 the Act's constitutionality should not be considered settled. This comment contends that the delegation of final decisionmaking authority to magistrates violates the text and purposes of article III. Part I explains
how and why article III limits Congress's power to vest judicial
decisionmaking authority. It outlines the two categories of exceptions to article III's tenure and salary provisions developed by the
Supreme Court, and describes the two models for interpreting the
purpose of article III that have been expressed in the Court's opinions. Part II compares magistrate adjudication and the recognized
exceptions to article III requirements, concluding that they do not
coincide. Part III discusses whether the magistrates' exercise of judicial power is nonetheless consistent with the underlying purposes
of article III. This part concludes that under neither of the Court's
approaches to article III can the constitutionality of magistrate adjudication be defended. Despite the attractiveness of magistrate
adjudication as an alternative to increasingly time-consuming and
expensive adjudication by federal district court judges, the powers
15See Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1471-1482 (1982)) (repealed by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 343).
16 Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 218 (1984); WhartonThomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983); Gairola v. Virginia, 753 F.2d 1281
(4th Cir. 1985); Puryear v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette
Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v.
Clark Oil Refining Corp., 739 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Pacemaker Diagnostic
Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), withdrawn and reh'g
granted, 718 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); Fields v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890
(D.C. Cir. 1984); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Since Northern Pipeline, commentators have taken different positions on the constitutionality of the 1979 Magistrate Act. Compare Note, United States Magistrates Hearing
Civil Cases: The Constitutionalityof Rendering Final Judgments After Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 897 (1984) (arguing in
favor of constitutionality), and Note, FederalMagistrates and the Principlesof Article III,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1947 (1984) (same), with Comment, Is the Federal MagistrateAct Constitutional After Northern Pipeline?, 1985 ARiz. ST. L.J. 189 (arguing against
constitutionality).
17 D.L. Auld v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
'8 Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
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given to magistrates by the 1979 Act exceed those which Congress
may grant to non-article III officials.

I.

ARTICLE

III AS A LIMIT ON CONGRESSIONAL GRANTS OF
ADJUDICATORY POWER

Article III of the Constitution defines the contours of the federal judiciary. It both grants certain powers to the judicial branch
and describes the manner in which those powers may be exercised.
The text of article III is clear as to how the judicial power is to be
exercised. But while the scope of the judiciary's powers is indicated
in a description of the classes of cases to which the "judicial Power
of the United States" extends, 19 article III nowhere defines the
troublesome concept of "judicial Power." Even though article III
purports to establish a discrete category of governmental power, it
provides no clear dividing line between constitutional and unconstitutional restrictions or expansions of the judicial realm.
A.

Article III's Tenure and Salary Provisions
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution provides that
[t]he judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in
one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 0

This language requires Congress to provide judges with undiminishable compensation and tenure during "good Behaviour" whenever it creates an inferior court that exercises the "judicial Power
of the United States."'" Thus, the framers left Congress free to de1'U.S.

CONST.

art. I1,

§ 2, cl. 1:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between a State and
Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
20

Id. art. III, § 1.

Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59. The term "good Behaviour" has long been interpreted to mean life tenure, with removal only under the impeachment standard of article II,
§ 4. See, e.g., O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 529-530 (1933).
21

1036

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:1032

fine the role of the "inferior" federal courts, but restricted its ability to define the institutional character of those courts. 2
These restrictions on Congress protect judicial independence
and impartiality. Judges who exercise "judicial Power" are not to
be subjected to influence through manipulation of their tenure or
salary.2 3 Such influence is undesirable for several reasons, relating
to both the substantive protections of the Constitution and the
structure of the government it establishes.
First, an independent judiciary is necessary to protect individual rights. Constitutional rights by definition transcend the political compromises of the day; only judges insulated from the formal
24
political process can preserve those rights against popular causes.
Thus, independent judges help assure to all citizens the enjoyment
of rights and liberties granted by the Constitution.
Second, an independent judiciary is essential to the underlying
structure of government created by the Constitution. Federal
power is dispersed among separate branches in order to avoid political domination by any particular group. A system of checks and
balances supplements this division by arming each branch against
encroachment of its power by the other branches.2 5 Within this
system, the tenure and salary requirements of article III protect
the judiciary from domination by the executive branch or the legislature. If the President or Congress were to have the power to appoint judges for limited terms or to reduce judges' salaries, there
would be a danger that the judiciary would merely present the
26
views of the branch controlling it.

22

23

See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64 n.15.
The Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal to allow removal of judges by the

executive and legislative branches. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON1787, at 428-29 (1911); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART

VENTION OF

AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (2d ed. 1973). As Alexander Hamilton said: "Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made,
would in some way or other, be fatal to [the courts'] necessary independence." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
24 The Supreme Court has stated emphatically that the "primary purpose" of the salary protections is "to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential
to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to persons and with equal concern
for the poor and the rich." Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920).
25 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) (discussing checks and balances
in the Constitution).
26 As the Court recently stated: "A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and
Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of government." United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
217-218 (1980); see also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 413 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933).
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Third, an often overlooked component of judicial independence is that article III also protects judges from control by other
judges.27 Undue influence from within the judicial branch would be
a serious obstacle to unbiased adjudication. 8 Salary and tenure
protections are necessary if judges are to decide facts and interpret
the law in accordance with their own beliefs despite opposition or
29
even ridicule from their colleagues.
Fourth, an independent judiciary plays a vital role in regulating the federal government's relationship with the states. Article
III was drafted and considered amid considerable distrust of federal power.3 0 In particular, the states hoped to avoid a federal judiciary deferential to the wishes of the President and Congress, especially since the federal judiciary was to be granted jurisdiction over
cases involving state law or with states as parties. 1 By insulating
the federal judiciary from external influence, the tenure and salary
provisions in article III prevent presidential or congressional incursions on state sovereignty under the guise of judicial decision.
Finally, judicial independence fortifies the judiciary itself. Life
tenure and undiminishable compensation increase public confidence in judicial decisions.3 2 These protections also help to ensure
the continued attraction of qualified candidates to the federal
33
bench.
The values underlying article III's tenure and salary protec27 See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970); id. at 136-37 (Douglas,

J., dissenting); id. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting); Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 770 F.2d
1093, 1106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring).
2' During the debates of the Virginia state convention of 1829-1830, Chief Justice Marshall asked: "Is it not, to the last degree important, that [the judge] should be rendered
perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or control him but God and
his conscience?" See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1933) (quoting Marshall's statement).
29 See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 714 (1979); Note,
Article I Courts, supra note 13, at 583-84.
30 Indeed, some states did not want lower federal courts at all. The Constitution thus

allows Congress to decide whether to establish them. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124-25 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937); CHARLES WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 2 (4th ed. 1983).
31 See RAOUL BEROER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 8, 117-19 (1969); Tushnet, Invitation to a Wedding: Some Thoughts on Article III and a Problem of Statutory Interpretation, 60 IOWA L. REv. 937, 944 (1975); Note, Article I Courts, supra note 13, at 583. Judge
Posner has noted that "[t]he states have not consented to have issues of their own law
determined by judges who do not have the guarantees of independence that Article III requires for federal judges." Geras v. Lafayette Lighting Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1052 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting).
22 Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 59 n.10; Note, Article I Courts, supra note 13, at 583.
22 See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 533 (1933).
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tions represent the stakes in the controversy about the constitutionality of magistrate adjudication. If magistrates exercise the "judicial Power" of the United States, then their lack of article III
protection will undermine these values.
B. Exceptions to the Rule: Delegation of Adjudicatory Powers to
Non-Article III Officials
The Supreme Court has acknowledged two situations in which
Congress can create adjudicatory institutions whose officials lack
the tenure and salary protections of article III: Congress can grant
to legislative courts jurisdiction over certain matters to which the
"judicial Power of the United States" also extends, and it can assign certain functions ordinarily performed by article III judges to
adjunct officers of the federal courts.
1. Delegation of Jurisdictionto Legislative Courts. Although
article III, section 2 describes the cases to which the judicial power
of the United States extends, 34 it does not give the federal judiciary exclusive power to adjudicate such cases.3 5 Other institutions
acting under different sources of authority-state courts, for example-may also exercise jurisdiction over matters enumerated in
section 2 without being considered article III courts. Likewise, article III protection need not be extended to certain congressionally
created courts even though they decide cases within the realm of
federal judicial power.3 6
34 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
" The Court has long recognized that non-article III courts may be granted jurisdiction over cases to which article III judicial power clearly extends. See Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 63 n.14; Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 (1973); Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553, 566 & n.1 (1933). Similarly, when Congress creates an article III court
it need not confer on it all the jurisdiction granted by article m, § 2. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 561 (1955).
3' See, e.g., NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-70; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828).
There have been two approaches to the question of why legislative courts do not need
to meet article III's requirements. The first argues that legislative courts, because they were
created under Congress's article I or article IV powers, do not exercise article III judicial
power, and thus need not meet article III's requirements. See, e.g., Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
at 545 (the jurisdiction of the territorial courts "is not a part of that judicial power which is
defined in the 3d article of the Constitution"); United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 13-14 (1955) (military courts' jurisdiction is limited because Congress's article I
powers over the military are limited). The second, which Justice White seemed to follow in
Northern Pipeline, argues that legislative courts do exercise "judicial Power," but are exempted from article III's requirements. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 105 (White, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting proposition that legislative courts do not exercise article III power). In
essence, these approaches are the same; under both the legislative courts are exempted from
article III because they were created under article I or article IV congressional powers.
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The Supreme Court has permitted such "legislative courts" in
three separate situations. First, the Court has allowed Congress to
create non-article III courts to serve the territories of the United
States. Because the territorial courts ostensibly were created under
article IV, which grants Congress plenary authority over the territories, and not under article III, they were found not to be subject
to article III's tenure and salary restrictions.3 7 The Court has upheld the creation of military courts for a similar reason. Article I
empowers Congress to "provide and maintain a Navy" 38 and to
make "Rules of the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces."39 On this basis, Congress's power to establish special
courts for the trial and punishment of military offenses is "without
any connection" to and "entirely independent" of article 111.40 And
lastly, the Court has approved Congress's creation of non-article
III courts for the adjudication of "public rights."' 41 This category
includes matters historically within the prerogative of the executive or legislative branches and that could have been completely
committed to non-judicial determination. 2

Under either approach, the key jurisdictional inquiry is whether Congress has created these
courts under its power to create "inferior" article III courts, or under some other power.
S Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) at 545. The Court followed the same reasoning in allowing
Congress to create territorial legislative courts in the District of Columbia, see Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), in the Indian territories, see Wallace v. Adams,
204 U.S. 415, 423 (1907), and in the consular territories abroad, see In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891).
38 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.13.
39 Id. art. I, § 8, cl.
14.
40 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). In subsequent decisions, however,
the Court has limited the jurisdiction of courts martial so as not to encroach upon matters
otherwise outside the realm of the military. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11 (1955) (the jurisdiction of the military court does not extend to the trial of a recently discharged civilian even though his offense was committed during active service).
41 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
284 (1856) ("there are matters, involving public rights,. . . which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
of the United States"); see also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929). In contrast, other "inherently" judicial matters may not be removed from the cognizance of the
article III courts: Congress cannot "withdraw from [art. III] judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
" The Court originally relied upon a "public rights" rationale in approving Congress's
creation of such legislative courts as the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, see Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), and the Court of Claims, see Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 553 (1933). Both cases dealt with courts exclusively hearing suits "between the
government and others." Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451. Both of these courts have since been
ruled article III courts. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (noting that subsequent legislation indicated Congress's intent to create these courts under its article IU
power). The "public rights" doctrine has also been invoked to allow Congress to vest adjudi-

1040

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:1032

The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status of legislative courts in its 1983 decision, Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.43 In Northern Pipeline the Court
considered whether Congress could grant to non-article III bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under
title 11 [of the United States Code] or arising in or. related to cases
under title 11." 44 Justice Brennan, in a plurality opinion, rejected
the claim that the bankruptcy courts were legislative courts created under Congress's article I power to establish "uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies. '45 Instead he argued that Congress's power to create legislative courts was limited to the three
historically accepted categories of cases discussed above, all of
which stemmed from "exceptional constitutional grants of power"
to Congress.46 Despite their tie to an enumerated article I power,
the bankruptcy courts did not fall into any of the three categories,
particularly because the bankruptcy courts exercised jurisdiction
over claims relating to bankruptcy but arising entirely under state
or common law.4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist declined to decide
whether Congress's grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts
as a whole violated article III. 4 1 Instead, he limited his decision,
and thus the decision of the Court, to the holding that the jurisdiction of non-article III courts could not, absent litigant consent, extend to cases arising entirely under state or common law. To the
extent that the Bankruptcy Act granted such jurisdiction, it vio49
lated article III.
The Court returned to the question of legislative courts in
Thomas v. Union Carbide AgriculturalProducts Co.50 Union Car-

catory powers in administrative agencies. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
The Court's most recent statement on the "public rights" doctine was in Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985), discussed infra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
43 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
44 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
46 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 & n.25.
47 Id. at 71-76.
48 Id.
at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 91. In Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3334-35, a majority of the court characterized the
Northern Pipeline holding as follows: "Congress may not vest in a non-Article M court the
power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to
ordinary appellate review."
0 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985).
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bide challenged the constitutionality of a federal product registration program in which certain claims between private registrants
were subjected to binding arbitration by an independent, non-article III decisionmaker. 51 In approving the scheme, the Court emphasized that Northern Pipeline stood only for the proposition
that Congress may not empower non-article III officers to adjudicate issues of state law without the parties' consent.5 2 The Court
held that the arbitration scheme challenged in Thomas did not fall
within that prohibition: the arbitrable claims involved rights which
more closely resembled public than private rights. Since these
"public rights" issues "could be conclusively determined by the
Executive and Legislative Branches,""3 their resolution by non-article III officers carries little threat to "the independent role of the
'54
judiciary in our constitutional scheme.
Northern Pipeline and Thomas do not definitively determine
the full extent of Congress's power to delegate judicial power to
non-article III legislative courts. They do, however, provide some
insight into the relationship between article III and the power to
create legislative courts. First, and most important, a majority of
the Court in Northern Pipeline acknowledged that the power to
create non-article III legislative courts is in fact limited by article
III. Before Northern Pipeline,the Court had never struck down a
congressional grant of power to what was arguably a legislative
court on the grounds that it violated article III. 5 Second, both decisions suggest that there is a "core" of federal jurisdiction which
in some instances Congress may not delegate to officials who lack
tenure and salary protection. Even under the potentially expansive
"public rights" doctrine, Congress is limited in its power to delegate to non-article III courts jurisdiction over common law and

51

Id.

at 3328-30. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7

U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (1982), pesticide manufacturers wishing to register their products are
required to submit research data concerning the effects of their products to the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(D). If more than one manufacturer seeks to register a given product, EPA may use the data provided by an earlier registrant to evaluate
the product of a later registrant. Id. The Act requires that the later registrant compensate
the earlier registrant for use of the data. If the parties cannot agree on compensation, the
Act requires that the dispute be decided through private arbitration. The arbitrator's decision is binding, and is reviewable in an article III court only for "fraud, misrepresentation or
other misconduct." Id. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii).
52 105 S. Ct. at 3334-35.
53

Id. at 3334.

" Id. at 3338.
5 The Court has in the past restricted the jurisdiction of the legislative courts, but
never struck down the underlying statute as unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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state law matters.
2. Delegation of Adjudicatory Functions to Court Adjuncts.
It has long been established that not all adjudicatory functions in
federal courts must be performed by article III judges. 6 Courts,
particularly those sitting in equity, traditionally have appointed judicial "adjuncts" to perform particular functions for the court. In
theory, this kind of delegation, unlike the delegation of jurisdiction
to legislative courts, is a delegation entirely within the judicial
branch; the adjunct's power derives from the article III court, in
which jurisdiction and control remain vested.5 7 For example, masters and commissioners have long aided judges by taking testimony, identifying the questions at issue, and making preliminary
determinations of fact.5 8 Their proceedings were subject to the direction of the court and their findings, at least as to matters of law,
were essentially advisory.59
Despite the longstanding use of adjuncts, few Supreme Court
decisions have tested the constitutional limits to their use. The

'" The seventh amendment's requirement of trial by jury, for example, delegates decisionmaking authority to juries. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
" The lower courts' power to delegate authority to masters or referees arises out of a
long common law tradition of such subordinate judicial officers. See generally Silberman,
Masters and MagistratesPart I The English Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1071 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Silberman, The English Model]; Silberman, Masters and MagistratesPartII:
The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297 (1975). The use of masters in federal court
in the United States has been described as "coeval with the organization of our judicial
system." Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128 (1864); see also Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 51-52 (1932) (parties have no right to demand that a court disturb the findings
of a master absent an error of law). The practice of referring cases to masters with the
consent of the parties was mentioned by the Court as early as 1810. See Field v. Holland, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 8, 21 (1810); see also Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 82,
90 (1847) ("it is now well settled ... that the appointment [of an umpire] is good"). The
Court explicitly approved lower court delegation of certain functions to adjunct officers regardless of the consent of the parties in Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 314 (1920) (approving the appointment of an auditor to frame the issues and express an opinion).
Congress's power to create adjunct officers of the federal courts arises as a "necessary
and proper" corollary to its power to create inferior federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
9 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court."). When "viewed within the entire judicial framework set up by Congress," delegation of limited adjudicatory functions to adjuncts seems consistent with the principle that
the judicial power of the United States be vested in article III courts. Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 76-77.
58 See generally Silberman, The English Model, supra note 57 (describing operation of
English master system).
.. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 61 (1932); Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 523
(1889); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 133 (1864). For the current rules governing
use of masters, see FED. R. Civ. P. 53; see also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249
(1957) (discussing references to masters under rule 53(b)).
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first case to address the issue, Crowell v. Benson,6" considered Congress's power to delegate judicial functions to a non-article III administrative agency, the United States Employees' Compensation
Commission. 1 In Crowell, the Court tested the constitutionality of
the adjunct delegation by looking at whether it deprived article III
courts of the "essential attributes" of judicial power.6 2 Delegating
general fact-finding authority to an administrative agency was acceptable for the same reasons special masters or commissioners
could assist courts in admiralty: the court retained all power over
questions of law, the agency's power was limited by statute to a
narrow range of factual questions, and the agency's orders could
not be enforced except by order of the district court.6 s But vesting
the agency with the power to determine facts of constitutional importance, such as whether or not the case fell within the federal
admiralty jurisdiction, would rob the court of the "essential attributes" of judicial power and would thus not be permitted by article
111.64

In United States v. Raddatz 5 the Supreme Court applied the
"essential attributes" standard to the 1976 Magistrates Act. The
Court upheld Congress's delegation to magistrates of the authority
60 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

" The Court in Crowell did not define administrative decisionmakers as "adjuncts."
The Court did, however, analogize to traditional adjuncts, id. at 51, and Justice Brennan
later analyzed Crowell as an adjuncts case, Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 78 ("The use of
administrative agencies as adjuncts was first upheld in Crowell."). Although the agency's
power was based on federal statutes defining congressionally created rights, the Court rejected a "legislative courts" analysis because the rights involved were essentially "private
rights" arising under the admiralty jurisdiction of article M. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51. The
Court defined an issue of private right as one "of the liability of one individual to another
under the law as defined." Id.
62

285 U.S. at 51.

11 Id. at 44-45, 54.
1, Id. at 56-57. The statutory scheme in Crowell withstood the "essential attributes"
analysis because certain "constitutional facts," especially those relating to the agency's jurisdiction, were to be decided de novo by the federal court without deference to the agency's
findings. Id. at 63-64. The agency's power to decide other facts, however, was not limited by
article III since "there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes
of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by
judges." Id. at 51; see supra note 57.
The Court's emphasis on the distinction between "constitutional" and other facts was
diminished in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936), where the
Court stated that "th[e] judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not require
or justify disregard of the weight" of administrative findings. Although St. Joseph involved
the requirements of the due process clause rather than those of article III, its challenge to
Crowell's de novo review requirement has been adopted in article I cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682-683 (1980).
45 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
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to hear certain dispositive pretrial motions on the grounds that the
district court maintained sufficient control over the proceedings."'
The statutory scheme at issue in Raddatz gave the district court
"plenary discretion" to decide whether to authorize a magistrate
hearing and automatically subjected the magistrate's findings to de
novo review by the district court. In light of this, the Court found
that the magistrate's power did not remove the "ultimate decision"
from the district judge, and thus left the "essential attributes" of
67
the judicial power in an article III court.
The Court last discussed adjuncts in Northern Pipeline. In his
plurality opinion, Justice Brennan reiterated the test of Crowell
and Raddatz: 6 although Congress can prescribe the manner in
which congressionally created rights can be adjudicated, it may
only do so in a way which retains the "essential attributes" of judicial power in an article III court.6 9 He then identified several ways
in which the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 7 impermissibly vested the
essential attributes of the "judicial Power of the United States" in
bankruptcy courts: first, the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction was
coextensive with that of the district courts for all matters related
to bankruptcy questions;7 1 second, bankruptcy courts exercised all
the ordinary powers of the district courts, including the power to
conduct jury trials and to issue declaratory judgments, writs, and
orders;721 third, the bankruptcy courts issued binding and enforcea-

" Raddatz dealt with the judge's treatment of a magistrate's recommended decision on
a motion to suppress evidence. Much of the case considered the due process aspects of the
judge's review of the magistrate's recommendations. See 447 U.S. at 679-681.
6 Id. at 683 (quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976)). On the same
grounds, the Court rejected petitioner's due process objections to the handling of pretrial
hearings by magistrates: the article 1II judge remained the "ultimate decisionmaker," with
"broad discretion to accept, reject or modify the magistrate's proposed findings." Id. at 680.
The district judge read over the testimony transcript and the magistrate's report and listened to oral argument before making the final decision. Id. at 672.
68 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81. The concurring opinion did not explicitly address
the question, except to say that the bankruptcy courts clearly were not "adjuncts" of the
district courts. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice White objected to the plurality's
analysis on the grounds that it failed to rationalize why the Raddatz test represents the
constitutional limit. Id. at 101 (White, J., dissenting).
6, Id. at 81 (plurality opinion). In Crowell, the district court retained full authority
over matters of law, 285 U.S. at 49; in Raddatz, the court retained power to review the
magistrate's findings and make the ultimate decision before entry of judgment, 447 U.S. at
683.
'0 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1482
(1982)).
71 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85.
72 Id.
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ble final judgments. 3 Given these powers, the bankruptcy courts
were not "adjuncts," but rather entities independent in jurisdiction
and function from any article III court, and hence
unconstitutional.7 4
These cases stand for the proposition that adjunct adjudication cannot preclude an article III court from making the final determination of certain issues. In other words, the "essential attributes" of the judicial power must remain with the article III court.
In Crowell, Congress did not remove the essential attributes of judicial power from article III courts because courts retained full
power to review agency determinations of questions of law and of
certain questions of fact. The scheme in Raddatz survived because
magistrate decisions were essentially advisory and did not constitute final determinations.
C.

The Scope of the Exceptions: Competing Views of Article III

Although the Supreme Court has identified two different categories of cases in which Congress can delegate judicial decisionmaking powers to non-article III officials, it has never precisely defined the scope of those categories. It may be possible, then, to
defend the Magistrate Act in any of three ways: as fitting within
narrow definitions of the categories; as fitting within expansive definitions of the categories; or as an independent exception to article
III's tenure and salary requirements. Which approach a court takes
depends fundamentally upon its view of the meaning of article III.
The Court's decisions, particularly those dealing with the creation of legislative courts, reveal two competing approaches to article III.7 5 The first approach, most recently expressed by Justice
Brennan in his plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline, might be
termed the "constitutional principles" approach. Under this conception of article III, Congress must comply with the tenure and
salary restrictions whenever it establishes an institution that exercises the "judicial Power of the United States. '76 Congress need
Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 87.
75 The two approaches considered here have been developed in the context of the
Court's decisions on the constitutionality of the various legislative courts. They are equally
applicable, however, in the context of limitations on Congress's power to create adjuncts. In
both situations, the essential question is to what extent article III prevents Congress from
creating adjudicatory institutions or officers not subject to that article's tenure and salary
provisions.
16458 U.S. at 58-59; see also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 420 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("If the power exercised is 'judicial power' defined in Art. III. . . then
7

71
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not do so if the decisionmaking institution it creates merely exercises adjudicative power derived from other sources, such as Congress's article I authority.77 It is for the Court to determine the
nature and source of the jurisdiction exercised by the decisionmaker-a determination that is not to rest upon congressional
7
intent.
It might be argued that the "constitutional principles" approach amounts to little more than a labeling process:7 9 neither the
text of article III nor the Court's confusing precedents provide a
test for determining whether a particular court or official exercises
"the judicial Power of the United States."8 0 The approach has,
however, emerged in practice as a narrow restriction on Congress's
ability to create alternatives to article III adjudication. Because
adjudication of matters within the constitutional scope of the judicial power by non-article III institutions is seen as a threat to the
power and independence of the federal judiciary, the "constitutional principles" approach would limit encroachments to exceptional situations where non-article III adjudication is both necessary to meet unique circumstances and poses less of a threat to
judicial authority."1
In contrast, the second approach to article III, which might be

the standards and procedures must conform to Art. III, one of which is an independent
judiciary.").
17 See, e.g., supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
78 See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 459 (1929); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 602-03 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see id. at 542 (plurality opinion).
7' An example of this is Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962), where Justice
Harlan argued that whether a court exercises article III judicial power depends upon
whether the judges of that court were endowed with lifetime tenure and undiminishable
salary. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 113 (White, J., dissenting) ("One hundred and
fifty years of constitutional history.., had led to a simple tautology."). Similarly, Justice
Brennan's opinion in Northern Pipeline has been challenged for inadequately justifying its
refusal to extend legislative court status to the bankruptcy courts. See 458 U.S. at 103-05
(White, J., dissenting).
SO See 458 U.S. at 103-05 (White, J., dissenting). But see Currie, Bankruptcy Judges
and the Independent Judiciary,16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 461 (1983) (arguing that precedent supports Brennan's approach).
81 The "constitutional principles" approach is weakened by its failure to recognize decisions of the Court which have upheld congressional grants of adjudicative authority to
non-article III officials in part because of the impracticality of endowing large numbers of
officials with life tenure. See, e.g., Glidden, 370 U.S. at 547 (legislative courts have been
created as a result of a "confluence of practical considerations"). Thus, to the extent that it
construes article III narrowly, this approach clashes with the flexibility the Court has read
into article III through a long line of decisions running from American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), to Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); see also Tushnet,
supra note 31, at 940 (the Court's precedents reduce article III limits to a requirement that
congressional departures from article III be "reasonable").
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termed the "due process" approach, is based upon the idea that
Congress may grant the power to decide cases falling within the
judicial power of the United States to non-article III officials so
long as Congress provides institutional safeguards to preserve the
values embedded in article III. This view can be seen in two recent
opinions: Justice White embraced it openly in his Northern Pipeline dissent, 2 and a majority of the Court appeared to use it in
Thomas.
In Northern Pipeline,Justice White proposed a test that balances the burden of a particular institutional arrangement on article III values against "the values Congress hopes to serve" through
the use of courts not staffed by article III officials. 3 His major concern is the process by which a litigant's rights and responsibilities
are adjudicated, rather than the source of a particular court's or
official's power to adjudicate. Carried to an extreme, this approach
suggests that article III's tenure and salary protections add little or
nothing to the due process clause, 4 and that article III need be
followed only when "under the circumstances, the constitutional
requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process."8 5
Like Justice White in Northern Pipeline, the majority in
Thomas seemed to balance congressional interests against article

" 458 U.S. at 115 (White, J., dissenting).
83 Id. Justice White based his position in part on a broad reading of the language of his

majority opinion in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), which stated that "the
requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment," id. at 407-08; see Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 114-15 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing Palmore). One commentator
has suggested that Palmore stood for the proposition that the Court would allow Congress
to create a legislative court whenever Congress's decision to do so was "reasonable."
Tushnet, supra note 31, at 940. But in Northern Pipeline, the plurality rejected Justice
White's reading of this passage and argued that the word "areas" in the above passage applied only to "geographical areas," not subject-matter areas. 458 U.S. at 76.
8'U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The framers of article III clearly intended the tenure and
salary provisions to limit Congress's ability to encroach on judicial power. Justice White's
"due process" approach can be criticized because a balancing test could permit Congress to
trump the constitutional language. Like many balancing tests, the "due process" approach
may give undue weight to legislative interests like "efficiency" or "economy" at the expense
of important but unquantifiable constitutional values. See, e.g., NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S.
at 73, 74 n.28.
85 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Northern
Pipeline,458 U.S. at 117 (White, J., dissenting). But see Note, Article I Courts, supra note
13, at 584-585 (arguing that due process review would be inadequate to replace the requirements of article III). Although this comment refers to this view as the "due process" approach, it does not derive from the fifth or fourteenth amendments, except by the indirect
analogy made here.
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III values. The Court did examine the source of power vested in
the arbitrator: it noted that questions subject to arbitration fall
within the category of "public rights."8 6 But the Court's inquiry
did not stop with the categorical status of the arrangement. The
Court also found it important that the arbitration provision served7
a significant legislative purpose in a larger regulatory framework.8
In addition, the Court tried to estimate the provision's potential to
encroach on judicial independence: the Court found that the arbitrator was no more likely to be influenced by the political branches
than was an article III judge, 88 and that the arbitration scheme relies "only tangentially, if at all, on the Judicial Branch for enforcement."8 9 Thus, Thomas pays attention not only to the traditional
exceptions to article III's tenure and salary protections, but also to
"the concerns motivating the legislature" and the impact of the
statutory scheme on "the independent role of the judiciary in our
constitutional scheme." 90
The approach in Thomas, like that of Justice White in Northern Pipeline, differs from the "constitutional principles" analysis
by explicitly considering a broad range of competing values, thus
giving Congress greater freedom to create alternatives to article III
adjudication. But the decision in Thomas indicates that the Court
is not willing to abandon the "constitutional principles" inquiry
into the nature and source of the non-article III institution's powers."1 Rather, the Court appears to be staking out a middle ground:
the Court will ask whether a challenged institution fits within the
traditional exceptions to article III's limitations, but in determining the reach of those exceptions the Court will examine whether
the institution adequately accommodates article III values.

II. Do

MAGISTRATES EXERCISE THE "JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES?"

Ten circuits have concluded that magistrate adjudication
under the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 does not violate article
111.92 In essence, the courts have followed a pure "due process" balancing approach. They argue that although the Act delegates full
86 Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3337. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment on this basis. Id. at 3343.
87

Id. at 3337-38.

" Id. at 3338.
89 Id.

90 Id.
91

Id. at 3337.

92See supra note 16.
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adjudicatory functions to non-article III officials, which seems constitutionally suspect, it contains procedural mechanisms to protect
litigant rights and the separation of powers. Because magistrates
only adjudicate disputes when parties have so consented, litigants
are held to have waived their right to be heard by an article III
judge in the same way as they can waive the right to jury trial or
the privilege against self-incrimination." And, because the Act
gives article III judges control over magistrates-article III judges
appoint magistrates, refer cases to magistrates, remove cases from
magistrates in certain circumstances, and review magistrate decisions on appeal-the magistrates are thought to be adequately insulated from the influence of the legislative and executive
branches.94 The Act is judged constitutional under a "due process"
balancing approach since it combines an important legislative interest-reducing the federal judges' caseload-with an institutional structure that protects article III values.9 5
But the courts have approved of the Magistrate Act without
analyzing the sources of magistrate power. Such an analysis is central to the "constitutional principles" approach, which would invalidate the Act if magistrates are found to fall outside the established exceptions to article III's tenure and salary requirements.
But, as Thomas shows, the analysis is pertinent to the Court's current "due process" approach as well.9 6 The Act would be invalid
under a Thomas-style "due process" approach if the extent of the
Act's intrusion upon the "judicial Power" is not warranted by the
purposes of the delegation-and the extent of that intrusion is
likely to be determined at least in part by the disjunction between
the delegation and the traditional exceptions of article III. 97 The
following discussion therefore examines whether magistrates exercise adjudicatory power either as officers of legislative courts or as
1 See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537, 543 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); Wharton-Thomas v. United States,
721 F.2d 922, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1983).
" See, e.g., Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 545-46; Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 927.
" Contrast the majority's approach in Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 541, 547, with that of
the dissent, id. at 550 (Shroeder, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3336 (using "public rights" category while rejecting
"doctrinaire reliance" on formal categories), discussed supra notes 86-91 and accompanying
text.
. For example, the Court has consistently held that Congress's delegation of judicial
functions to non-article Ill courts must be tied to "exceptional constitutional grants of
power to Congress." See, e.g., Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 n.25. While Justice White
appeared to abandon this principle in his dissent in Northern Pipeline, id. at 104, the approach taken by the majority in Thomas was consistent with it. 105 S. Ct. at 3337-38 (expanding, rather than abandoning, "public rights" category).
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adjuncts of district courts. If they do not fall within these categories, then they should be seen as impermissibly exercising the "judicial Power of the United States" unless their role is validated by
the "due process" approach.
A. Magistrate Jurisdiction and Congress's Power to Create
Legislative Courts
One way Congress might have granted magistrates the authority to hear and decide cases falling within the federal judicial
power is through its power to establish legislative courts. Much of
the pre-Northern Pipeline commentary considering the Magistrate
Act focused on this approach."8 But since Northern Pipeline,
courts have largely rejected that approach as inapplicable to the
constitutional problems posed by the Magistrate Act.9
Magistrates differ from officers of legislative courts in four major respects. First, magistrates are situated within and controlled
by the judicial branch; legislative courts are not.101 Second, the
magistrates' power to hear cases is triggered only on referral by the
district court and consent of the parties; a legislative court's power
is triggered upon the filing of the case.10' Third, the district court
may remove cases from a magistrate on its own motion or on motion of the parties;0 2 legislative courts are only subject to appellate
judicial review. Fourth, magistrates are appointed by federal
10 3
judges in a process free of executive or legislative involvement;
legislative court judges are usually appointed by the President with
Senate approval. 0 4 Because these four factors create a high degree

of integration with district courts, magistrates resemble judicial
adjuncts much more closely than they resemble officers of legislative courts.
Furthermore, the scope of magistrate jurisdiction under the
1979 Act exceeds that which could be vested in a legislative
98 See, e.g., Note, Article I Courts, supra note 13, at 568 & n.62.
91 See, e.g., Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 925-27.
100 For a discussion of judicial controls on magistrates, see infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
101See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1982) (granting to the Administrator of the Department of Health & Human Services the power to make disability determinations).
102 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6) (1982).
103

Id. § 631(a).

4 E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(1) (1982) (United States Court of Military Appeals "consists

of three judges appointed from civil life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate").
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court.10 5 The Supreme Court's holding in Northern Pipeline, even
as limited by Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion, 0 6 makes
clear that article III limits congressional power to grant jurisdiction to legislative courts: legislative courts cannot exercise jurisdic1 07
tion over matters arising entirely under state or common law.
Those matters "may be resolved only by an agency which exercises
'[t]he judicial power of the United States.' "1os Congress's power to
authorize legislative courts extends only as far as "certain exceptional powers bestowed upon [it] by the Constitution or by historical consensus."'1 9 But the magistrates' authority is not based on
any specific, exceptional power of Congress. Magistrates exercise
subject-matter jurisdiction over a significant number of federal
criminal matters and any federally cognizable civil matter, including cases involving non-government parties and purely private
rights. Thus, even if Congress can create legislative courts within
its power to prescribe the manner of adjudication for any congressionally created right-the furthest extreme suggested by North0-the magistrates' jurisdiction
ern Pipeline"1
definitely exceeds the
limits of that power.
The requirement of party consent does not make the argument that the Magistrate Act can be justified as an exercise of
Congress's power to create legislative courts any less constitutionally suspect."' In considering the subject-matter jurisdiction of article III courts, the Supreme Court has emphasized that litigant
consent cannot substitute for constitutional power. 1 2 Analogously,
105 The magistrates' jurisdiction also could not be vested in an administrative agency,
since even under Justice Brennan's expansive characterization of agencies as adjuncts in
Northern Pipeline, agencies are still restricted to "specialized" functions. 458 U.S. at 80
n.32.
106 See id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 90; see also Thomas, 105 S. Ct. at 3334-35.
' 458 U.S. at 89. The same basic view was expressed as early as 1856, when the Court
stated that Congress cannot "withdraw from [article III] judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1856).
1o, Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 70. But see id. at 104 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "exceptional powers" test cannot be a legitimate limitation on Congress).
110 Id. at 80 & n.32 (plurality opinion); id. at 94 (White, J., dissenting).
'" The various opinions in Northern Pipeline all seem to indicate that consent of the
parties might affect the legislative courts analysis, although the question was not directly
before the Court. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79 n.31; id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 92 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting). For criticism of
the argument that consent legitimates delegations of judicial authority that would otherwise
be violations of article III, see infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16-17 (1951) (removal to
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litigant consent should not legitimate a legislative court in exercising jurisdiction which Congress lacks the constitutional power to
grant in the first instance.
Thus, even assuming that certain aspects of the legislative
court analysis might apply to adjudication by magistrates, Congress exceeded its power by authorizing magistrates to hear any
civil matter within the jurisdiction of the federal district court. If
only as a matter of the source and scope of their jurisdiction, magistrates exercise the "judicial Power of the United States."
B.

Magistrate Functions: Are Magistrates Adjuncts or Judges?

Congress might also have empowered magistrates to make final decisions in federal court under its power to delegate particular
court functions to judicial adjuncts. Indeed, both the House and
Senate reports on the Magistrate Act saw the expansion of the
magistrate's role under the 1979 Act as enlarging the powers of an
"adjunct" officer of the district court. 113 Adjunct status is also consistent with the historical development of magistrate powers: Congress initially granted magistrates only a limited ability to conduct
hearings or hear motions, reserving to federal judges the power to
make final decisions.
But the power of magistrates under the 1979 Act goes beyond
that traditionally exercised by adjuncts. To determine whether the
magistrates' power to make final, binding decisions with the consent of the litigants is consistent with article III, it is necessary to
identify the limits on Congress's ability to empower adjuncts to
perform particular adjudicatory functions normally performed by
judges. Those limits mark the point at which magistrates cease to
be mere adjuncts and begin to exercise the "judicial Power of the
United States."
Under Crowell, a delegation of judicial functions to adjuncts
violates article III if the the delegation removes "essential attributes" of judicial power from article III courts. 114 In Raddatz the
delegation survived that test; in Northern Pipeline it did not.
When compared to the powers exercised by non-article III officers

federal court denied for lack of diversity of citizenship, which cannot be cured by consent of
the parties).
n3 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1469, 1471 (magistrate is defined as a "judicial officer whose purpose was to assist the
district judge"); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 8 ("the magistrate is an adjunct of the
United States District Court").
114 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51; see supra notes 60.64 and accompanying text.
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in those cases, magistrate adjudication under the 1979 Act seems
to fall outside the permissible scope of adjunct delegation.
Although the powers of magistrates differ in many respects
from those at issue in Northern Pipeline,11 5 the magistrates nonetheless share many of the attributes that made the role of bankruptcy judges unconstitutional. Magistrates exercise the powers of
district court judges during the trial or hearing, subject only to
threat of removal to the district court in "extraordinary circumstances."' 6 A magistrate's decision is a final decision of the district
court," 7 and may bind future litigants as precedent." 8 The decision typically is not reviewable by an article III judge except on
appeal, and then is subject to the same standard of review as other
district court decisions."19 In some respects magistrate power goes
115 For a description of the bankruptcy courts' powers under the Bankruptcy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2459, see Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53-56. Magistrates are more like the old bankruptcy referees than like post-1978 bankruptcy judges. See
id. at 79 n.31 (comparing the pre-1978 Bankruptcy referees with the post-1978 bankruptcy
judges).
'1 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1982). Unlike district court judges, however, magistrates do not
have the power to punish for contempt. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (1982). In Geras v. Lafayette
Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984), the court argued that the lack of
the contempt power adequately distinguished magistrates' powers from those of federal
judges: magistrates' power to enforce their decisions is more limited than that of judges.
However, the civil contempt power is rarely used. See id. at 1049 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, magistrates do have the power to issue orders to show cause before the district
judge why the person should not be held in contempt-and the judge is to hear evidence
pertaining to the order in a "summary manner." 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (1982). Finally, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962), the Court expressed its doubt "whether the
capacity to enforce a judgment is always indispensable for the exercise of judicial power."
There the fact that certain judgments of the Court of Claims were sometimes unenforceable
because of subsequent congressional action did not bar a finding that the court exercised
article III judicial power. Id. at 571.
11
Geras, 742 F.2d at 1044. The idea that entry of judgment is merely formal was refuted by the plurality in Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.38 (" 'The award of execution
• . .is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial
power. It is no judgment in the legal sense of the term, without it.' ") (quoting Chief Justice
Taney's memorandum in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864)); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568-69 (1962) (same).
118 It is not yet clear how much precedential value will be accorded to the final decisions of magistrates. To some extent this will depend upon how widely magistrates' decisions are disseminated. Nothing in the Magistrate Act prevents the publication of magistrates' decisions or their use as binding precedent. They are public documents, see Geras,
742 F.2d at 1051 (Posner, J., dissenting), and reporting services have made them available,
see, e.g., USA Today v. Breakthrough Mktg., Inc., No. 84-5140 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 1985)
(available Nov. 25, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Arnold v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 1 18,255, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3381 (D. Minn. 1984); Ronholt v.
United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9678 (W.D. Wash. 1984).
"1 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3)-(4) (1982); cf. FED.R. Crv. P. 52(e)(4) (review of recommendations of masters); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982) (review of administrative agency decisions).

1054

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:1032

well beyond that formerly granted to the bankruptcy courts, since
magistrates may determine any matter of fact or law within the
district court's jurisdiction.
The magistrates' powers under the 1979 Act also exceed those
approved in Raddatz. Raddatz approved delegation of adjudicatory functions to magistrates only where an article III judge retained final decisionmaking power. Magistrates now have the
power to render final decisions without de novo review by an article III district judge. Although the magistrate scheme considered
in Raddatz may effectively have permitted magistrates to make
some final decisions, such decisions are of a completely different
character in the absence of de novo review. Mandatory de novo
review placed on article III judges a duty to examine the magistrates' findings and weigh the parties' objections before entering
final judgment. By eliminating this duty, the present scheme
grants to magistrates authority far beyond that permitted in
Raddatz.
Some circuit courts have discounted the importance of de
novo review because in practice judges may give the magistrate's
findings cursory review or miss crucial credibility factors when determining the weight of the evidence. 120 But even if de novo review
does not "insure full Article III participation in the decision of
every case,"1'21 it does guarantee an active role for article III judges
in adjudication. This participation assures greater
control than
1 22
removal.
sponte
sua
of
threat
the
by
afforded
that
In another context, the Supreme Court has defined judicial
power as "the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who
bring a case before it for decision."12 3 The 1979 Magistrate Act
vests precisely that power in magistrates. It removes the article III
judge from the entire decisionmaking process-from the hearing of
preliminary motions, to the taking of evidence and testimony, to
the rendering of the final decision. 2 4 The only decision made by
the article III judge is whether to refer a particular case to a magis-

120

See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 546

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984); see also Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683 & n.11
(comparing magistrates to masters, whose "recommendations are advisory only, yet this
Court regularly acts on the basis of the master's report and exceptions thereto").
"' Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683.
122 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6) (1982).
123 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911) (discussing "case or controversy"
requirement) (citation omitted).
124 See HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
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trate. 12 ' After delegation, the judge's role is entirely passive, except
for the rare cases that present sufficient grounds to remove the
case from the magistrate.2 6 Magistrates under the 1979 Act have
become de facto judges exercising the "essential attributes" of the
127
judicial power.
Even proponents of the 1979 Act agree that to vest so much
power in the magistrate without the consent of the parties would
violate article III's express requirement that the "judges" of inferior courts be endowed with tenure and salary protections. But
they assert that the consent of the parties to adjudication by a
magistrate legitimates what would otherwise be an unconstitutional exercise of the federal judicial power. 128 Crowell, Raddatz,
and Northern Pipeline provide no analysis of the effect of consent.
Instead, courts find precedent for this argument in two nineteenthcentury Supreme Court cases-Heckers v. Fowler'2 9 and Kimberly
v. Arms' 3 °--which approved the longstanding practice of adjudication by masters and referees with the consent of the parties.' 3 '
In Heckers the parties to a diversity action in federal court
consented to be bound by the judgment of a state referee as if it
were a judgment of the court. The lower court enforced the agreement, and ordered judgment to be entered in conformity with the
referee's findings. 3 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon the historical practice of referring pending actions to
referees whose findings were considered final if and only if the parties gave their consent beforehand and neither party later
125 The judge's role may be even more limited if he or she has issued a standing authorization for consensual reference to a magistrate, which was the procedure preferred in the
House Report. See id.
125 That some cases might be removed from the magistrate under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6)
does not change the conclusion that, for those cases which are adjudicated by a magistrate,
the statute has effectively removed the "essential attributes" of judicial power from the
article III court.
V127See Geras, 742 F.2d at 1046 (Posner, J., dissenting) (even though magistrates are
not called "judges," "[w]hat they are called is not important; what they do is important").
268 See id. at 1042 (reference to magistrates cannot be sustained unless alternative of
article III judge is "realistic and viable"); Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 542 ("Consent is important to the constitutional analysis.").
129 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1864). Heckers was a suit for breach of contract, with jurisdiction based on diversity.
130 129 U.S. 512 (1889). Kimberly was also a contract suit with jurisdiction based on
diversity.
'21 See, e.g., Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 218
(1984); Pacemaker,725 F.2d at 545; Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 727 F.2d 922, 928
(3d Cir. 1983).
'22 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 127.
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objected. 3
In Kimberly the parties agreed that a master should decide
the issues between them, and that the master's report should be
subject to "'like exceptions as other reports of masters.' 1's4 The
Supreme Court held that although the master's findings are
"merely advisory" in the absence of the parties' consent, 135 "the
master [becomes] clothed with very different powers" when the
parties consent to the reference. 136 Where reference is consensual,
the master's findings should "be taken as presumptively correct,"
and overturned only when "there has been manifest error" of fact
37
or law.1
Essentially, Heckers and Kimberly were merely cases about
enforcing the full scope of particular private agreements. The
proper modern analogy to these cases is arbitration. The arbitrator's decision may be binding and ordinarily beyond the district
court's review, but it is not an exercise of federal judicial power. 38
Rather, parties to an arbitration agreement have consented to go
outside the article III courts for adjudication by a private decisionmaker hired only to resolve the instant dispute. In contrast,
adjudication by a magistrate, even on consent of the parties, is an
exercise of judicial power entirely within the article III court by an
officer of the court. 3 9 The magistrate's final decision not only
binds the parties at hand, but may also serve as precedent for subsequent litigation0 with the full weight and authority of any district
14
court decision.
Even if Heckers and Kimberly are thought to involve delega-

133 Id. at 133.
134 129 U.S. at 516-17 (quoting parties' agreement).
"35 Id. at 523.
'36 Id. at 524.
137 Id.
138 For a detailed discussion of the source of the arbitrator's power and the effect of his

judgment, see Baker Indus. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 570 F. Supp. 1237, 1248-53 (D.N.J. 1983); see
also United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
139 As the House Report noted, "[w]hen the magistrate tries a case, jurisdiction remains in the district court and is simply exercised through the medium of the magistrate."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 8. This view is also consistent with the argument made by
several courts that consent to magistrate adjudication is a "choice of officers" within the
federal court. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.
1984) (consent is "parties' choice of. . . forum"); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721
F.2d 922, 926 (3d Cir. 1983) ("parties' consent went . . .to the judicial officer within the
court who conducted the trial"); see also Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir.
1979) ("[j]urisdiction remains vested in the district court and is merely exercised through
the medium of the magistrate").
140 See supra note 118.
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tion of judicial functions to referees as officers of the court, their
deference to litigant consent does not support the grant of final
decisionmaking power to magistrates. In both cases the Court indicated that, regardless of consent, the federal judge retained the
power to review the referee's findings before the entry of judgment.141 Federal courts retain no such power with regard to final
decisions of magistrates. While "extraordinary circumstances" may
result in removal of the case from the magistrate, the 1979 Act
precludes review of the magistrate's decision before it is entered as
the district court's final decision. 142 To use the language of Raddatz, the "ultimate decision" rests with the magistrate, not the ar1 43
ticle III judge.
Moreover, Heckers and Kimberly contain no analysis relevant
to the constitutional objections to the Magistrate Act. The Court
ruled only on the validity of individual masters' decisions under
the "peculiar circumstances" of each case;14 4 it did not consider the
validity of a statutory scheme to institutionalize adjudication by
non-article III officers. In sum, Heckers and Kimberly provide no
persuasive authority for the proposition that litigant consent
removes the serious article III concerns that inhere in Congress's
delegation of adjudicatory authority to magistrates.
III.

Is

THE MAGISTRATES' EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL

POWER CONSIS-

TENT WITH ARTICLE III PRINCIPLES?

The previous section has shown that the 1979 Act's grant of
final decisionmaking power to magistrates exceeds the accepted
limitations upon the power that Congress may grant to legislative
courts or judicial adjuncts. The Act thus constitutes a grant of "judicial Power" to non-article III officials. Under the "constitutional
principles" approach, this requires the conclusion that the Act is
unconstitutional. However, as Thomas shows, the inquiry under a
14

The Court expressly noted that the referee's report was filed without objection, and

apparently considered this as relevant a factor as were reference and consent: "Judgment
having been entered without objection, and pursuant to the order of the court and the
agreement of the parties, it is not possible to hold that there is any error in the record."
Heckers, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 133.
1'
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1982).
143 447 U.S. at 683. This same consideration also distinguishes the power
of the magistrate from that of the modem master under rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Unlike the magistrate under the 1979 Act, the master does not have the power to enter final
judgment. The master's report is reviewable by the district court which may accept or reject
the report. Although the master's report is entitled to deference or review on a "clearly
erroneous" standard, the court need give no deference to the master's findings of law.
144 Heckers, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 133.
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"due process" approach now shifts to whether the extent of the
Act's intrusion upon "judicial Power" is warranted by the purposes
of the delegation. In other words, do the purposes served by the
Magistrate Act outweigh its negative effect on article III values?
On one side of the balance are the immediate benefits of magistrate adjudication. Increasingly crowded federal courts and resulting delays make it impossible to deny the need for measures to
enhance the efficiency of federal courts. Magistrates help the federal courts adjudicate a greater number of cases without the need
for additional judges. In fact, the "success" of magistrate adjudication is evidenced by the fact that the number of cases heard by
1 45
magistrates has increased annually.
On the other side are the costs to article III values inherent in
these benefits. The courts which have used the "due process" approach to approve the Magistrate Act have recognized two article
III values: litigant rights and the separation of powers. However,
the courts have greatly underestimated the extent to which magistrate adjudication compromises those values, and have ignored
other important article III values that are seriously undermined by
the 1979 Act.
A.

Magistrate Adjudication and Litigant Rights

Some proponents of the 1979 Act argue that the central purpose of article III is to protect the rights of litigants. The "right"
to an article III judge is like other fundamental rights that the individual can waive, such as the right to a jury trial, the right to be
146
free from self-incrimination, and even the right to trial itself. If
this is true, the consent requirement renders magistrate adjudica-

145

In 1983, magistrates heard 1,933 cases pursuant to their powers under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). In 1984, this number rose to 3,546. From 1983 to 1984, the magistrates' caseload
increased at an annual rate of 13.4 percent. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS: A PICTORIAL SUMMARY 4 (1984). In addition, the number
of magistrates has increased significantly. The number of authorized positions for magistrates rose from 61 in early 1970, to 228 in fall, 1982. CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 11 (1983). For a general description of the magistrate
system after the passage of the 1979 Act, including recommendations for further reform, see
THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM: REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF

THE UNITED STATES (1981). A more recent study of magistrate adjudication is presented in
CARROL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES 59-68 (1985) (describing

magistrate adjudication in practice in nine district courts) [hereinafter cited as C. SERON,
NINE CASE STUDIES].
"6 See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537, 543 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
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tion consistent with article III.' 47 Litigants can protect their rights
by insisting on adjudication by an article III judge, but may choose
to waive those rights by consenting to magistrate adjudication. 48
This line of argument is based on an incomplete interpretation
of article III. First, article III is about much more than litigant
rights; it defines important limits on congressional authority and
delineates the role of the judiciary in the constitutional framework
of government." 9 Litigants decide whether to consent to magistrate adjudication on the basis of pragmatic considerations such as
likelihood of success and speed of resolution. They have little personal interest in protecting values such as the separation of federal
powers, the allocation of powers between the states and the federal
government, or the public's interest in maintaining a highly qualifled, impartial judiciary. 50 Nor are these concerns vindicated by
review or removal for actual violations of due process. Reduced judicial impartiality will seldom result in measurable injury to the
litigant.'"
Second, even if litigant rights are considered the sole concern
of article III, the 1979 Act inadequately protects those rights. The
consent requirement only protects the rights of litigants involved
in the particular case. But parties not involved in the case will also
be affected by the magistrate's decision. Because the magistrate's
decision is entered as the final decision of the district court, it potentially has full precedential value and may influence the results
of subsequent cases. 52 Thus, litigants in later suits have an interest in assuring that a case which may bind them as precedent is
adjudicated by a judge whose impartiality is protected by article
III. The consent requirement in the 1979 Act does nothing to pro-

,47 See, e.g., Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (7th Cir.
1984); Pacemaker,725 F.2d at 541-43.
148 See Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 739 F.2d 1313,
1315 (8th Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
172 (1984); Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 543.
"I' See supra text accompanying notes 23-33.
"'0 At least one commentator has argued that article III endows no "right to an article
III judge" since the tenure and salary provisions were intended primarily as a structural
provision to ensure against encroachments on judicial power by the legislative or executive
branches, not merely as protection for individuals' rights. Note, Federal Magistrates and
the Principles of Article III, supra note 16, at 1952-54. Litigants should not be able to
"waive" the structural provisions of the Constitution.
151The Supreme Court has shown that it is aware of this problem. For example, in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Court overturned a decision in which a nonarticle III judge had participated in deciding a case in federal court, even though there was
no showing of de facto injury or violation of due process.
152 See supra note 118.
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53

B. Magistrate Adjudication and Structural Values
1. JudicialIndependence. Magistrates remain subject to tenure and salary manipulation by Congress: magistrates are appointed for limited terms and Congress can reduce their salaries at
any time by amending the statute. Nonetheless, the circuit courts
have argued that judicial control over magistrates satisfies article
III by protecting adjudication from legislative and executive interference. The main purpose of article III, they argue, is to protect
the judicial branch from influence by the political branches; Congress can vest judicial authority in non-article III officers if it provides sufficient procedural protections against such influence.
The courts point to four mechanisms that are supposed to
guarantee that the judiciary controls the magistrates. 54 First, district court judges control magistrates through the case reference
process, which requires the judge to "specially designate" a magistrate before the magistrate can exercise authority under the Act. 55
'15 A less compelling objection to the consent argument focuses on the voluntariness of
consent. Magistrate adjudication arguably involves hidden "coercion" rendering the parties'
consent involuntary. The Senate Report explicitly stated that the Act was intended to make
the federal courts more accessible to the "less-advantaged" who "lack the resources to cope
with the vicissitudes of adjudication delay and expense." SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at
4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1472. As long as litigation before a
district court judge requires more time and expense than does magistrate adjudication, individuals will feel pressured to consent to trial by magistrate. See Pacemaker,725 F.2d at 554
(Schroeder, J., dissenting). This is especially true in criminal cases, where the alternative to
consent by magistrate may be a longer stay in jail for those who lack sufficient resources to
make bail. Additionally, a litigant may feel pressure to consent to magistrate adjudication so
as not to irritate the judge who would then have to hear the case. See C. SERON, NINE CASE
STUDIES, supra note 145, at 61, 65 (describing how lawyers feel they "have little choice" but
to consent when the judge raises the issue).
Nevertheless, this objection based on voluntariness is not decisive for several reasons.
First, the Act empowers the district court to adopt "procedures to protect the voluntariness
of the parties' consent." 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 73(b) ("No...
court official shall attempt to persuade or induce a party to consent to a reference of a civil
matter to a magistrate . . . ."). The "voluntariness" of litigant consent also may be reviewed on appeal as a matter of due process, or may constitute grounds for removing the
case to the district court. But see Swallow Turn Music v. Tidal Basin, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 504
(D. Me. 1984) (consent cannot be withdrawn in the absence of coercion or "extraordinary
circumstances"). Even though voluntariness could be a concern in individual cases, it is not
a problem unique to magistrate adjudication or one that the courts are unaccustomed to
dealing with in the context of waiver of other rights. It therefore seems unlikely that an
objection based on voluntariness can create a constitutional bar to magistrate adjudication
except, perhaps, in individual cases on due process grounds.
':5 See, e.g., Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544-45.
5528 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982). The House Report states that it is preferable that the
district court authorize the magistrate to hear and decide cases under a standing general

1985]

The Boundaries of Article III

1061

The district court judge also has the power to rescind an earlier
referral to the magistrate upon the court's own motion "for good
cause shown," or upon "extraordinary circumstances" shown by
the parties. 1' 6 Article III judges maintain further control over magistrate decisions through appellate review in either the district or
circuit courts. 1 57 Finally, the appointment and removal of magistrates is entirely in the hands of article III judges. Judges determine the number of magistrates in each district 58 and select and
remove magistrates within certain statutory standards of fitness
and performance. 59
Despite these control mechanisms, tenured judges do not participate in magistrate adjudication to the extent required by article
III. First of all, the referral, removal, and appeal provisions allow a
significant number of cases to be adjudicated entirely by magistrates. The requirement of formal referral will not deter judges
from delegating cases to magistrates; as the docket increases judges
will have an incentive to refer as many cases as possible to magistrates.16 0 And once referred, few cases are likely to present the "extreme circumstances" required for removal."6 ' Even fewer cases

authorization, HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 11, although the statute does not on its face
bar case-by-case reference of matters to the magistrate. See C. SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES,
supra note 145, at 66-67 (in some districts previously designated magistrates are assigned
randomly after party consent).

,56 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(6) (1982).
'17Id. § 636(c)(3)-(4) (magistrate's decision appealable to court of appeals unless parties consent at time of reference to appeal to district court). In Northern Pipeline, Justice
White argued that the availability of appeal to an article Ill court tipped the balance in
favor of constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts. See Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 11516 (White, J., dissenting).
:58 28 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982).
'6' Id. § 631(i) (providing for removal of magistrates for "incompetency, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability").
160 As district court caseloads rise, it is more likely that the requirement of consent will
act as the only effective check on the "wholesale delegation" of cases to magistrates. Collins
v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 119-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 218 (1984). As one dissenter noted, if the judges had the time to consider the reference of each case individually,
and then to consider whether that reference should be vacated sua sponte, there would be
no need to create magistrate positions. See Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 552 (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting).
"' Precisely what is meant by "good cause" or "extraordinary circumstances" has yet
to be determined, although the few district courts which have considered the question suggest that it must be more than mere dissatisfaction with the magistrate's handling of the
trial. E.g., Swallow Turn Music v. Tidal Basin, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 504, 510 & n.8 (D. Me.
1984); Southern Agriculture Co. v. Dittmer, 568 F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Gomez
v. Harris, 504 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 n.6 (D. Alaska 1981). The Senate Report on the Magistrate Act states that the removal power is "to be exercised only where it is appropriate to
have the trial before an article III judicial officer because of the extraordinary questions of
law at issue and judicial decisionmaking is likely to have wide precedential importance."
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will be subject to scrutiny by an article III judge on appeal; factual
determinations might never be subject to meaningful review. In
any event, Northern Pipeline stands squarely for the proposition
that a chance to appeal a non-article III officer's decision to an
article III court does not validate an otherwise unconstitutional
delegation.16 2 In sum, as one court conceded in defending the Act,
"a radical shift to trial by magistrate could easily result in a finding of unconstitutionality" as the "reality" of judicial control over
163
magistrate authority declines.
Even beyond its questionable effectiveness in protecting magistrates from control by the political branches, judicial control of
magistrates is deeply flawed as a mechanism for safeguarding constitutional values. Indeed, whatever indirect control the 1979 Act
allows article III judges to exert over magistrates is itself inconsistent with the nature of judicial decisionmaking required by article
III. District court judges have the power to appoint and to remove
magistrates."" This power is inconsistent with the understanding
represented by article III that "[n]o matter how strong an individual judge's spine, the threat of punishment-the greatest peril to
judicial independence-would project as dark a shadow whether
cast by political strangers or by judicial colleagues."' 6 5 The tenure
and salary provisions of article III protect judges not only from the
political branches, but from undue influence by other judges as

supra note 13, at 14, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 1483. It
is clear that the effectiveness and utility of magistrate adjudication would be quickly undermined if courts readily granted relief when the litigants raised post-consent objections. For a
discussion of how the standard for removal might be applied, see Note, FederalMagistrates
and the Principlesof Article III, supra note 16, at 1960-61.
162 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.39; id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The
Constitution clearly states that article III's tenure and salary protections apply to judges
"both of the supreme and inferior Courts." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
163 Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1984).
28 U.S.C. § 631(b)-(d) (1982) (appointment); id. § 631(i) (removal).
165 Kaufman, supra note 29, at 714; see also Note, Article I Courts, supra note 13, at
SENATE REPORT,

583-85. In Raddatz, Justice Blackmun stated in dictum that delegation of certain judicial
functions to magistrates is constitutional because "the only conceivable danger of a 'threat'
to the 'independence' of the magistrate comes from within, rather than without, the judicial
department." 447 U.S. at 685 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This statement would appear to
express the view that article III was not intended as a protection against threats from within
the judiciary. But the statute in question in Raddatz, unlike the 1979 Act, did not grant
final decisionmaking power to magistrates. While Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in
NorthernPipeline cited this dictum with apparent approval, 458 U.S. at 79 nn.30 & 31, the
citations appeared in the course of his discussion of Raddatz. Elsewhere in his opinion,
Justice Brennan noted as a matter of general principle that "[tihe guarantee of life tenure
insulates the individual judge from improper influences not only by other branches but by
colleagues as well, and this promotes judicial individualism." 458 U.S. at 59 n.10.
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well.' 6 Magistrates cannot be truly independent with regard to the
cases before them as long as they are subject to indirect control by
district court judges.
The ultimate effect of magistrate adjudication, then, is to remove a significant number of cases from any participation by article III officials. Some cases adjudicated by magistrates will involve
direct participation by article III judges through appellate review,

,6 Since the Court has dealt mostly with cases involving legislative encroachment on
judicial power, much of its discussion of the tenure and salary provisions of article III has
focused on the separation of powers. In only one case, Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S.
74 (1970), has the Court expressly considered the question of judicial interference in the
independence of the federal judge. There the Court considered whether the judicial council
of the Tenth Circuit could deprive a district court judge of the power to take action on cases
filed in the district court on which he served. The Court suggested that the issue raised
article III concerns, id. at 84, but did not finally resolve the issue, id. at 87-89.
The outcome of Chandler indicates that federal judges may be subjected to a considerable amount of control by other judges, at least in regard to administrative matters. In dissent, however, Justice Douglas implied and Justice Black clearly stated that article III was
also meant to preserve the independence of the judge from tampering even by other article
III judges. See id. at 136-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting).
This position finds support in article II of the Constitution. Article II gives the Senate
and not the judiciary the power to impeach a judge for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4. The question of whether the Constitution requires that judges, at
least of the "inferior courts," be removable only by impeachment has been the subject of

considerable

debate. Compare

RAOU1L

BERGER, IMPEACHMENT~
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122-80 (1973) with Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal
Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 667 (1968) ("there is no point in
tinkering with the independence of federal judges by subjecting their tenure to control of
other federal judges appointed by the same defective process"). But the Supreme Court has
consistently adhered to the view that federal judges can be removed only by impeachment.
See Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 59; Chandler,398 U.S. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955).
Congress may have also violated article II by empowering judges to appoint magistrates. Federal judges must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
402 n.2 (1873). Several courts have argued that Congress may provide for the judicial appointment of magistrates without the advice and consent of the Senate because the Constitution allows Congress to vest "in the Courts of Law" the power to appoint "inferior Officers" of the United States. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2; see Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1931) (commissioners may be appointed by district courts as
inferior officers); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (Congress may authorize judges to
appoint commissioners). But this argument begs the question by assuming that magistrates
are "inferior Officers." Magistrates do seem to be "inferior Officers" with regard to some of
their functions. But when they exercise "the judicial Power of the United States," they may
cease to be inferior officers, becoming instead de facto federal judges. See Pacemaker,725
F.2d at 549-50 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (arguing that "inferior officers" refers to such officers as clerks of court, not officers who exercise article III power); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1982)
(stating that judges of the United States Claims Court, an article I court, are appointed by
the President with approval by the Senate). Since the power to choose who will exercise
federal judicial power is a significant component of the Constitution's system of checks and
balances, it should not be lightly removed from the President and the Senate.
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but such participation is constitutionally inadequate. And to the
extent that the Act attempts to provide indirect control as a substitute, it alters the judicial decisionmaking process in a way that
destroys the judicial independence required by article III.
2. Federalism and the Public Interest. The circuit courts
have also ignored the effect that adjudication by magistrates lacking article III protection has on the relationship between the states
and the federal government. Because federal courts exert jurisdiction over diversity cases arising entirely under state law and cases
in which states are parties, article III protects state interests in the
operation of federal courts. 6 7 By allowing magistrates to decide
these cases even though their decisions may be influenced both by
factors within the judicial branch and by congressional tampering
with salary levels or the appointment process, the Act violates the
states' interests in having state law issues adjudicated in federal
court by independent article III judges. Furthermore, some decisions by state judges are subject to federal review and reversal, and
magistrate adjudication could well undermine the authority of federal judges by weakening state judges' respect for the federal
judiciary.""
Lastly, the vesting of final decisionmaking authority in magistrates violates the public's interest in accurate and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary. Magistrates are now authorized
to decide issues of national scope and importance, to hold federal
and state statutes unconstitutional, and to issue decisions which
may have precedential impact on subsequent litigation. If article
III's tenure and salary requirements play any part in improving
the quality of federal adjudication-and the clear thrust of article
III is that they do-there is good reason to doubt the wisdom of
permitting magistrates to wield such broad powers.
In sum, the apparent practical advantages of the 1979 Act do
not outweigh its harm to article III values. Indeed, the foregoing
discussion suggests that many of the fundamental values protected
by article III, while perhaps less tangible than a quick reduction in
the judicial caseload, are potentially much more important and farreaching. 169 The Constitution specifies the powers of each branch
167

See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.

conducted habeas
corpus review of state court proceedings after remand by circuit court).
169 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) ("There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by
the Congress or by the President.").
168See, e.g., Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 465 (1974) (magistrate
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of government as a safeguard against expedient modifications of a
careful balance. As the ultimate arbiters of the Constitution, federal judges should be particularly careful in interpreting structural
provisions relating to their own authority, and should remember
the full range of purposes that guided the framers of article
III-despite their implications for the burdens of judicial office.
CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether one adopts the "constitutional principles" approach or the "due process" approach to interpreting article III, the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 transgresses the limits
that article III has placed on Congress's power to delegate judicial
authority to officials not granted life tenure and salary protection.
The Act extends to magistrates the major portion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and the key functions of the federal
judge. Empowered to enter a final decision, magistrates become de
facto federal judges. As a result, particular cases are entirely removed from active consideration by judges with the tenure and salary protections of article III. Consent, which protects the litigants
in the instant case to some extent, fails to protect non-parties, and
provides no safeguard against erosion of the structural values
served by article III. And the Act's scheme of judicial control, although intended to protect against executive and legislative interference, may result in an even greater threat to the independence
and impartiality of magistrates as final decisionmakers. Although
the expansion of magistrate adjudication may bring immediate
practical benefits to federal district court judges, it creates a direct
conflict with many of the fundamental values underlying article
III.
J. Anthony Downs

